Monuments by Michael S. Ellars Copyright Fall 1997 All Rights Reserved What constitutes a monument? There is not an easy answer to this question. Historians have often pondered the mystery surrounding monuments; in the last century, several architects, asserting the inherent link between architecture and monuments, have a lso attempted to explain the meaning of monuments. A proper survey of monuments would take several years to complete; but a good picture of the varied viewpoints regarding monuments can be gleaned from the analysis of four written selections: Architectu re After Modernism, by Diane Ghirardo; Reconstructing Architecture for the Twenty-First Century, by Anthony Jackson; The Architecture of the City, by Aldo Rossi; and The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and Its Origin, by Alois Riegl. Each of thes e authors presents a different of monuments. Yet of all of these, only Jackson's work truly touches the heart of the issue: that a monument is inherently a distinction made from within a culture, not from without. In between her rants on Disney's evil empire and the failure of London's Docklands, Ghirardo lays a foundation for her views on monuments with a short discussion of Aldo Rossi's monument to Sandro Pertini at the Via Croce Rossa in Milan, Italy. Extrapol ating from the information given in her book, clearly Ghirardo's monuments are very public and intentionally invite public reaction (either positive or negative) - they are "[a]esthetic objects [that] invite aesthetic judgments" (Ghirardo, 104). These ju dgments form mainly from a cultural perspective, specifically what a particular culture likes and dislikes. At the same time, however, these judgments are not limited by the requirements of logic: what is deemed appropriate for a private artifact may be denounced if it is moved into the public realm. Ghirardo subtly expresses her disdain for this duplicity, but she openly yearns for a less discriminatory view of public space and the monuments that create and inhabit it. Jackson's view is that a monument is a deeply cultural element independent of the Zeitgeist. In his critical look at the profession of architecture, Jackson attacks the ideas of an "international style" and "art for art's sake," citing architects' staun ch refusal to follow the desires of different cultures. Even though a foreign "power" may attempt to impose its world view on a culture, only the culture itself is truly empowered to make the decision of what constitutes a monument. Jackson also express es his desire for architecture (and by association, monuments) to become more vernacular - that is, more responsive to site- and cultural-specific influences. The monument of Rossi's world is what he dubs a permanence. It is an integral part of a city, either as a static element which has lost a need for its function, or as a dynamic element whose function has changed (and will continue to change) over time; and in both cases, it continuously affects the urban fabric around it. The monument is "a past that we are still experiencing" (Rossi, 59). Even if it is no longer in use, such as the Alhambra in Spain, it still has a noticeable impact on its city. And since Rossi views the city as a single man-made object, rather than a collection of independent parts, his argument naturally implies that monuments form the structure around which the city grows. The nature of the monument as the city's structure then requires that it be preserved, lest a part of the city succumb to decay. Riegl recognizes a disparity between the "traditional" definition of a monument (an intentional man-made object intended to record an important event) and the "modern" definition, which based not so much on intent as value. He defines not one, but a ser ies of values that assist in determining the importance (monumentality) of an artifact. Through several categories, Riegl attempts to explain the relatively modern fascination with otherwise mundane artifacts and their preservation as monuments. Even th ough he definitely supports the modern view of monuments, he also agrees that the traditional standpoint has validity, at least from a historical perspective. Each author presents his or her view in a different literary style, and this necessarily affects the power of the presentation. Riegl's excruciatingly dry and pedantic discourse quickly leads to reader apathy. Rossi's analysis of the nature of the city is slightly more interesting, but so drawn out that readers simply tire from fatigue. And at times, Ghirardo's lays her intent so subtly that it takes several readings to see past the plain wrapper of magazine-style exposé to the morsel of opinion below. Different from these three is Jackson's tirade against architecture and architects: in spite of (or perhaps, because of) the obvious danger of alienating the reader, his text is fast-paced with a clear, solid tone that provides excellent readability. Despite these differences in presentation, many of the authors share similar ideas regarding monuments. A key theme is that defining a culture's monuments is the role of that culture, not some foreign influence. Jackson best expresses this ideal, but i t is also present in Ghirardo's disdain for elitism within a culture; in Rossi's belief that a monument must be an integral part of a city; and in Riegl's explanation of the modern Kunstwollen, or cultural artistic sensibility. The ideas begin to part when the discussion turns to intentional monuments, that is, artifacts that were created to be monuments. Neither Ghirardo nor Rossi explicitly state if an artifact may be labeled a monument after its initial creation. Especiall y in the former case, the tendency is to lean towards the negative; mundane artifacts, such as storefronts, are exempt from the rigorous public scrutiny of monuments (Ghirardo, 104). In the latter case, the monuments of Rossi's city are inherent in the c ity's structure and therefore always intentional, whether or not the builders knew it at the time. On the other hand, both Jackson and Riegl explain not only such a possibility, but also the process behind it. Jackson cites the general public's disillusionment with modern architects (and their disregard for the desires of the public) as the reason fo r preservation of older urban artifacts. Essentially, the architecture profession and the public have two incompatible desires: the former for the pursuit of the perfect international architectural style, and the latter for simple, vernacular responses to culture-specific situations. The public no longer cares much for what architects deem important buildings, instead relying on its own intuition: "Nowadays whole districts of housing or warehouses are protected that were never accepted into the archite cts' canon of significant monuments" (Jackson, 14). Riegl's explanations of how and why artifacts are transformed into monuments long after creation is a bit easier to follow. Writing in the early twentieth century, he had yet to witness the full onslaught of the Modern movement and its total disregard f or distinctive cultural requirements. Nevertheless, he expresses a view similar to that of Jackson: that artifacts may become monuments, but only when a culture decides for itself if the artifact possesses enough value. Unlike Jackson, however, Riegl's monuments are not defined in reaction to a set of circumstances (in this case an undesirable architectural style), but rather in reaction to the importance placed on an artifact. This importance has many forms: age-value (important because it is old), historical-value (it marks a major event in history), art-value (it represents an art style no longer in production), and even newness-value (important because it is new). An artifact becomes a monument when it acquires an intangible amount of value; unless it is intentionally created as a monument, this acquisition of value can take a long amount of time. Obviously, the nature of monuments is not easily explained. This is partly because of the different values each culture possesses - what is considered an important (valuable) building in the United States may be totally inappropriate (and therefore unim portant) in the Bedouin culture of the Middle East. At the same time, the importance placed on the oasis that a Bedouin tribe practically worships is probably lost on a culture where getting a drink of water is as easy as turning on the faucet. Thus, fo llowing Riegl's system of values, monuments can only be defined up to a cultural level. This agrees perfectly with Jackson's argument against "international styles" of architecture and his remarks about the public's near-abandonment of the architectural profession. Yet Jackson goes one step further, arguing that it is not only awkward for one culture to create "monuments" within another, it is almost impossible. One may look to the pyramids of Ancient Egypt to see how cultures respond the another culture's monuments: total disregard, because the monuments do not represent what is importa nt to the culture in question. This is not due to public under-education and cannot be solved through explanation of what "should be valued." Both Rossi and Riegl tentatively lean toward the same conclusion, but neither author expresses his view clearly (or powerfully) enough to be convincing. Ghirardo's argument completely bypasses the variable nature of artifacts and declares that mundane o nes are forever condemned to be nothing more. Alone amongst the four, Jackson declares that there can be no standard for preservation because there is no possibility of a cross-cultural, international description of monuments. Ultimately, it is up to ea ch culture to decide - for itself - what is valuable enough to save as monuments. [Word Count: 1537]